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TEACHING UNCONSCIONABILITY THROUGH AGREEMENTS TO 
ARBITRATE EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS 
SUSAN A. FITZGIBBON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1991 the Supreme Court sanctioned mandatory arbitration of statutory 
employment claims.1  The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)2 provides for the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements as any other contract “save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”3  The 
likely imbalance of power between employer and employee, coupled with the 
fact that pre-dispute arbitration agreements relegate resolution of employment 
claims to a private forum with limited judicial review,4 has generated adverse 
reactions by various critics who oppose resolution of statutory rights in a 
private forum.  That criticism, however, seems to be beside the point given the 
Supreme Court’s decision that such claims are in fact arbitrable.  Although the 
Supreme Court has also rejected the proposition that so called “mandatory” 
arbitration clauses between employers and employees must fail because of 
inherently unequal bargaining power, it is surprising that more attention has 
not been paid to other grounds “as exist in law or equity” in examining 
arbitration clauses in specific factual contexts in contracts of employment and, 
in particular, to unconscionability. 
Addressing the topic of unconscionability in a first-year contracts class 
through pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate employment claims provides the 
opportunity to explore and evaluate the alternative dispute resolution method 
 
* Professor of Law and Director of the William C. Wefel Center for Employment Law, Saint 
Louis University School of Law.  I wish to thank Daniel McCarthy for his excellent research 
assistance. 
 1. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994). 
 3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).  Arbitration agreements not covered by the FAA are likely to be 
enforced under state arbitration statutes, which are very similar in substance to the FAA.  For 
instance, thirty-five states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), which generally 
parallels the FAA.  Section 1 of the UAA has the same quoted language of FAA § 2, and further 
provides that the UAA applies to arbitration agreements between employers and employees.  
STEPHEN K. HUBER & E. WENDY TRACHE-HUBER, ARBITRATION CASES AND MATERIALS, 733-
38 (1998). 
 4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1994); UAA §§ 12-13. 
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of arbitration.  Consideration of the employment relationship and out-of-court 
resolution of employment claims, including those arising from statutes 
designed to protect individual employees and to serve broader societal goals 
(such as eradication of discrimination based on race, sex, age and disability), 
may present a richer basis for discussion of unconscionability than, for 
example, the-out-of-court resolution of a computer purchase dispute.  Testing 
the social utility of these arbitration agreements in the employer-employee 
context should provoke lively inquiry along with serious analysis, and 
ultimately provide a most interesting and challenging vehicle for teaching 
unconscionability. 
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
Congress passed the FAA in 1925 to overcome the judicial hostility to 
agreements to arbitrate future claims, and to place arbitration agreements on 
equal footing with other contracts.5  Under the FAA, issues regarding the 
formation of an agreement to arbitrate are resolved according to relevant state 
contract law.6  Arbitration agreements may be invalidated based on ordinary 
contract defenses, such as unconscionability, without violating the FAA,7 but 
states and courts are precluded from “singling out arbitration provisions for 
suspect status.”8 
 
 5. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26  (1985).  
The FAA covers written arbitration agreements regarding “any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”  9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).  It excludes from coverage, 
however, employment agreements of seamen, railroad employees, and workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce.  9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).  To date, only the Ninth Circuit has 
interpreted this provision to exclude all employment agreements from FAA coverage.  Craft v. 
Campbell Soup Co., 161 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1998).  The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on 
this issue for the October 2000 term in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 
1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 2004 (2000) (No. 99-1379). 
 6. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). 
 7. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996).  See also Stephen J. 
Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1001 (1996) (advocating application of a contractual approach to issues of 
unconscionability in arbitration). 
 8. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.  “A court may not ‘rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to 
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this 
would enable a court to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.’”  Id.  (citing Perry v. 
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987)). 
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B. The Gilmer Decision 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the FAA expresses a “liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”9 and that the Congressional 
intent of the FAA requires rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements.10  
In the landmark case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme 
Court ruled that an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)11 claim 
could be subject to mandatory arbitration.12  The Court found nothing in the 
text, legislative history, statutory framework or purpose of the ADEA to 
preclude resolution of the claim in arbitration.13  Drawing upon the analysis in 
a trio of cases in which the Court enforced agreements to arbitrate other federal 
statutory claims,14 the Court reiterated “that ‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a 
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the 
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial 
forum.’”15  The Court further stated, “[s]o long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may litigate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent 
function.”16 
The Court rejected employee Gilmer’s general attacks on alleged 
deficiencies of the arbitral process (which was governed by the rules of the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)) as inconsistent with the Court’s current 
strong support of federal statutes sanctioning arbitration.17  In particular, the 
Court found no merit in Gilmer’s general speculation that the arbitration panel 
would be biased, noting that the NYSE arbitration rules and the FAA protect 
against arbitral bias.18  The arbitration procedure also was not deficient 
 
 9. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 10. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). 
 11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 12. 500 U.S. at 20.  The agreement to arbitrate arose under a Securities Industry Registration 
Application.  Id. at 23. 
 13. Id. at 26-32. 
 14. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614; 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriquez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 15. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). 
 16. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). 
 17. Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481). 
 18. Id.  See also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).  The Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 
(1974), decision that an adverse award from the arbitration procedure of a collective bargaining 
agreement did not preclude the grievant from pressing his federal employment discrimination 
claim in court was not controlling because, unlike the situation in Gilmer, in Gardner-Denver the 
labor arbitrator lacked authority to resolve statutory claims, the case did not arise under the FAA, 
the union rather than the employee agreed to arbitration and concern existed for the possible 
tension between protection of the individual grievant’s statutory rights and the union’s duty to 
represent the collective interest of all union members.  Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35. 
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because the NYSE rules provided for adequate discovery, made brief written 
opinions available to the public and imposed no limit on remedies available in 
arbitration.19  The Court also deemed the limited judicial review available in 
arbitration20 adequate to assure arbitral compliance with statutory 
requirements.21 
Gilmer was hired as a manager of financial services and had no choice but 
to agree to arbitration in his securities representative registration application.  
The Court, however, rejected Gilmer’s assertion of lack of bargaining power,22 
noting that disparity of bargaining power often exists between employers and 
employees.  The Supreme Court stated in fairly strong and plain terms that 
“mere inequality in bargaining power” would not render the agreement to 
arbitrate unenforceable.23  Accordingly, the Court left claims of unequal 
bargaining power and of procedural inadequacy in arbitration to be decided on 
a case-by-case basis.24 
Thus, in Gilmer the Supreme Court recognized that agreements to arbitrate 
statutory employment discrimination claims (if not precluded by statute) are 
enforceable under the FAA except upon proof of an ordinary contract defense, 
such as unconscionability, to the arbitration agreement.25  Enforcement of such 
an arbitration agreement will thus depend on evaluation of how the parties 
reached the arbitration agreement and the terms of actual arbitration procedure. 
With only one notable exception,26 lower courts have extended the Gilmer 
analysis and enforced agreements to arbitrate a variety of statutory 
employment claims including claims arising under Title VII,27 the ADA28 and 
the Family and Medical Leave Act.29 
 
 19. Id. at 31-32.  The Court also noted that even the inability to pursue a class action in 
arbitration would not defeat the agreement to arbitrate because of the value of resolving the 
individual claim.  Moreover, the EEOC could pursue a class action and equitable relief. 
 20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1994). 
 21. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32. 
 22. Id. at 33.  The Court also found no evidence of fraud or coercion to enter the arbitration 
agreement. 
 23. Id. at 32-33 (“Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to 
hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (holding that the 
grounds for revocation must specifically relate to the arbitration clause and not to the contract as a 
whole). 
 26. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F. 3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
Congress intended to preclude enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate Title 
VII claims when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
 27. See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 28. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 29. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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C. The Unconscionability Analysis 
Following the principle of freedom of contract (and absent fraud or 
duress), common law courts traditionally left to the parties evaluation of the 
fairness of a bargain.  By contrast, Courts of Equity historically refused to 
enforce agreements so unfair as to “shock the conscience” of the court.30  The 
equitable doctrine of unconscionability inspired the Uniform Commercial 
Code (U.C.C.) § 2-302 on “Unconscionable Contract or Clause,”31 which 
allows courts to regulate unfair bargains openly, eliminating the previous need 
to resort to “covert tools” such as interpreting contractual language against the 
offending party or stretching to find either offenses to public policy or 
shortcomings in the offer or acceptance process.32  While Article 2 of the 
U.C.C. applies only to transactions for the sale of goods, courts have applied 
the unconscionability principle to a wide variety of contracts as the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 on unconscionability demonstrates.33  
Despite the existence of the U.C.C. section and the Restatement provision, the 
definition of unconscionability remains sketchy and elusive. 
To determine whether a term or a contract is unconscionable, courts 
generally consider the fairness of the bargaining process (procedural 
unconscionability) and the fairness of the bargain (substantive 
unconscionability) in light of the “setting, purpose and effect” of the 
transaction at the time the contract was made.34  In other words, 
unconscionability generally includes “an absence of meaningful choice on the 
 
 30. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir 1948). 
 31. U.C.C. § 2-302 provides: 
  (1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder on the contract without the unconscionable 
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result. 
  (2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof 
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the 
determination. 
 32. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. 1 
(1981). 
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) provides: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may 
refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to 
avoid any unconscionable result. 
Id. 
 34. U.C.C. § 2-302(2); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. f (1981).  Many 
courts and commentators have adopted the procedural and substantive terminology described in 
Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485 (1967). 
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part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably 
favorable to the other party.”35  The late Professor and Judge Irving Younger 
explained his unconscionability analysis as a two-step process which first 
considered whether the bargain was fair, and if not, then considered whether 
the agreement was fairly reached—an imprecise process which ultimately 
seemed “to add up merely to the proposition that a judge’s conscience is his 
only guide.”36 
Fairness in the bargaining process involves consideration of several 
factors, including: disparity of bargaining power between the parties; whether 
the parties had an opportunity to read and understand the terms; whether the 
terms were in legalese or fine print; and whether exploitation of a poor or 
uneducated party occurred.37  Determining the reasonableness or fairness of the 
terms involves weighing the disparity of exchange in light of the entire bargain 
or assessing the inequity and oppressiveness of individual terms.  Generally, to 
find an unconscionable agreement or term, courts require proof of some 
mixture of procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability,38 
and an abundance of one type reduces the necessary amount of the other 
type.39  For example, proof of a contract of adhesion, which is usually a 
standardized form agreement offered by a stronger party on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis with no opportunity for the weaker party to bargain over the terms, may 
satisfy the “procedural” unconscionability prong of the analysis, but a showing 
of an unfair, oppressive term or terms will also be necessary to establish the 
“substantive” unconscionability prong and for a court to find 
unconscionability.40  The Supreme Court essentially followed this analysis in 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.41  In the context of its general approval of 
forum selection clauses,42 the Court enforced against an injured cruise 
passenger, a forum selection clause contained in the cruise ticket, despite 
 
 35. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 36. Irving Younger, A Judge’s View of Unconscionability, JUDGE’S J., Apr. 1974, at 32-33. 
 37. Id.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981). 
 38. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1531-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1981). 
 40. “The presentation of an adhesion contract to a person is not, like the presentation of a 
pistol to his head, sufficient, if proven, to prevent the enforcement of the contract no matter how 
‘fair’ its terms.”  Leff, supra note 34, at 508 (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 454-455 
(1932)).  Still, some commentators question enforcement of adhesion contracts because the 
weaker party has not manifested knowing and voluntary assent to the terms.  See, e.g., Todd D. 
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179-80 
(1983).  See also U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d 
(1981). 
 41. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 42. Cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
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finding that the ticket was an adhesion contract, because under the 
circumstances the forum clause was not unfair.43 
Because adhesion contracts challenge the basic notion of contractual 
assent, they often receive treatment different from other contracts in that the 
terms are subject to scrutiny for fairness and reasonableness despite the fact 
that the adhering party objectively manifested assent e.g., by signing the 
agreement.44  To quote Judge J. Skelly Wright’s classic articulation of this 
concern in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture:45 
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its 
terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain.  
But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a 
commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it 
is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his 
consent, was ever given to all of the terms.  In such a case the usual rule that 
the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and 
the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that 
enforcement should be withheld.46 
Upon finding unconscionability, a court may deny enforcement of the 
entire contract, or enforce the contract without the unconscionable term, or 
limit the term’s application to avoid unconscionable results.47 
In view of the strong federal policy supporting enforcement of agreements 
to arbitrate even statutory claims, under what circumstances should a court 
deny or limit enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate employment claims on 
grounds of unconscionability? 
III. ASSESSING THE FAIRNESS OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE EMPLOYMENT 
CLAIMS 
As noted in section II, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) ensures that 
written arbitration agreements will be enforced according to ordinary contract 
law principles.  Under the principle of unconscionability, courts may openly 
refuse to enforce an agreement, in whole or in part, where the court finds that 
the agreement contains oppressive, unfair terms and that unfair bargaining 
 
 43. “Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of 
which are not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have 
bargaining parity with the cruise line . . . Including a reasonable forum clause in a form contract 
of this kind well may be permissible for several reasons . . . .”  Carnival, 499 U.S. at 593.  The 
Court concluded that the chosen forum was not designed to discourage legitimate claims and was 
Carnival’s principal place of business as well as the departure and return point for many cruises.  
Id.  at 595.  The passengers conceded notice of the forum selection provision.  Id. at 590. 
 44. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). 
 45. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 46. Williams, 350 F.2d at 449-50. 
 47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
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conduct produced the agreement.  A contract of adhesion—offered by a party 
with superior bargaining power strictly on a take-it-or-leave-it basis—prompts 
additional judicial scrutiny to determine if the terms of the agreement were 
within the reasonable expectation of the adhering party or whether the terms 
were so oppressive or unfair as to be unenforceable.48 
Employers who condition offers of employment or continued employment 
on an agreement to arbitrate employment claims are usually offering adhesion 
contracts because the employer holds the stronger bargaining position and will 
not dicker over the terms of the arbitration clause.  Of course, the employer 
may be offering a pension and a health plan, also on a non-negotiable basis, as 
part of the same employment package.  Why then is the arbitration provision 
more suspect than a benefits provision?  The answer to that question lies in the 
description of the arbitration process. 
Arbitration is a private form of adjudication that provides for the 
adversarial presentation of evidence and reasoned arguments to a neutral party 
who is authorized to decide the matter.49  Unlike the alternative dispute 
resolution method of mediation, the arbitration process provides finality in that 
the arbitrator renders a binding decision and the arbitrator’s award is subject to 
limited judicial review.50  Unlike the judicial litigation process, in arbitration 
the parties control the process, first and perhaps foremost, by selecting the 
decisionmaker. 
The arbitrator must be impartial and unbiased in the dispute.  In theory, the 
arbitrator will have expert knowledge of the industry or subject matter in 
dispute and will have arbitration experience.  Arbitrators who bring a 
workplace perspective gained from experience in resolving workplace disputes 
may better understand how to fashion effective remedies.51 
Conducted in a private setting, at a time convenient to the parties and the 
arbitrator, arbitration is a more informal, less intimidating and less hostile 
process than litigation.  Generally, the rules of evidence are not followed.  
Discovery is limited to expedite the process and to avoid the expensive, time-
consuming, often hostile and protracted fishing expeditions, which may occur 
in litigation. 
The informal, less adversarial aspects of the arbitration process especially 
contribute to the possibility of maintaining a continuing relationship between 
the parties to the dispute and the process actually may have a therapeutic effect 
 
 48. See, e.g., Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 511-12 (Cal. 1985). 
 49. For fuller discussion of the arbitration process described in this paragraph, see, e.g., 
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER 
PROCESSES 199-203 (1992). 
 50. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994); UAA § 12. 
 51. See, e.g., David E. Feller, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims 
Under a Collective  Bargaining Agreement: The Odd Case of Caesar Wright, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 53, 78-80 (1998) (making this point in the labor arbitration context). 
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on the parties.52  Unfettered by crowded judicial dockets, procedures and 
discovery, arbitration generally produces quicker results and costs less than 
litigation.  In employment disputes, the savings in time and expense and the 
preferable aspects of arbitration benefit employees as well as employers.  Final 
resolution of claims in arbitration also benefits the courts and the public by 
reducing the number of cases filed for judicial resolution. 
Three particular attributes of arbitration motivate employers to adopt 
mandatory arbitration procedures to resolve employment disputes including 
statutory claims: the reduced cost, the finality of the process and fear of jury 
verdicts.53  Employers are concerned that jurors may not understand the issues, 
may be overly sympathetic to employees and may reach unpredictable or 
erratic results.54  The ability to finally resolve an employment dispute with less 
expense and without the delay of court dockets or appeals and only limited 
judicial review is also a major reason for employers to implement a mandatory 
arbitration plan.  Under broad pre-dispute arbitration agreements, employers 
“trade off” avoidance of the possibility of one big court case for arbitration of 
many smaller cases.55  Employers are less inclined to enter post-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate “run-of-the-mill” claims because those claims often 
fade away.56 
The strong opposition to arbitration of employment claims arises in the 
context of pre-dispute agreements, imposed as a condition of obtaining or 
continuing employment (so-called mandatory arbitration agreements) to 
resolve statutory claims.  The crux of the opposition is the perceived unfairness 
of forcing an employee to choose between obtaining or keeping a job and 
having the right to take a statutory employment claim to court.57  Critics of 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration believe that statutory employment claims, 
 
 52. Roger I. Abrams et al., Arbitral Therapy, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1751 (1994). 
 53. Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Jan. 
1997, at 8, 10, 78-79. 
 54. Id. at 79.  A recent study showing that in federal employment civil rights cases, 
employees won in jury trials no more than 35.5% of the time suggests that this fear may not be 
well founded.  See Marika F.X. Litras, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Civil 
Rights Complaints in U.S. District Courts, 1990-98, 9 & Table 9 (Jan. 2000) (hereinafter “DOJ 
report”). 
 55. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Krinlock Lecture Series: Mandatory Arbitration of Employee 
Discrimination Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 
8 (1998). 
 56. Id. 
 57. “Employees required to accept binding arbitration of [statutory employment claims] 
would face what for many would be an inappropriate choice: ‘give up your right to go to court, or 
give up your job.’” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. REL. 
REP. & RECOM. 32 (1994) (hereinafter “Dunlop Report”).  Former Secretary of Labor John T. 
Dunlop served as chairman of the commission and the commission and report often are referred 
to by his name. 
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and especially employment discrimination claims, should be resolved in court, 
rather than a private arbitration forum, because: in court the judge is a public 
figure accountable to the public and the decision is subject to appellate review; 
the public proceeding and published decision will have a deterrent, conduct-
regulating effect on employers; depriving courts of jurisdiction of employment 
claims will stifle development of the law; and arbitration procedures including, 
e.g., lack of juries and limited discovery, as well as the possibility of a “repeat 
player” arbitral bias favoring employers, may diminish employee rights.58 
Much of this criticism flies in the face of the Gilmer decision, and it must 
be noted that, with one exception, the circuit courts have extended the Gilmer 
analysis to a wide variety of statutory employment claims.59  In other words, 
the courts have not found a legislative intention to restrict resolution of 
employment claims to courts.  Moreover, such a change does not appear to be 
a priority on the congressional agenda.60  To avoid enforcement of pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements, employees must then turn to contractual defenses. 
The general framework of an attack on a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate 
employment claims on the ground of unconscionability should first 
demonstrate that the agreement is a contract of adhesion, imposed on the 
employee as a condition of employment, which represents procedural 
unconscionability, and then show that the arbitration agreement is 
substantively unconscionable because the arbitration procedure, designed and 
imposed by the employer, lacks basic elements of fair process.  While the 
Gilmer decision rejected the generalized claims of unequal bargaining power 
between employers and employees and of deficiencies in the arbitral process, it 
left resolution of such claims for decision on a case-by-case basis. 
It is noteworthy that critics generally do not attack voluntary post-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate even statutory claims, on the theory that the process by 
which the employee voluntarily agrees to resolve an existing claim in 
arbitration “must be fair enough to be attractive to the employee.”61  But even 
the fairest arbitration procedure will be a private proceeding with a privately-
selected decisionmaker and limited judicial review—if it really is still 
 
 58. See, e.g., EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, 915.002 (hereinafter 
“EEOC Policy”).  Further, as the EEOC has emphasized, under federal employment 
discrimination statutes, individual employees serve as “private attorneys general” and “[t]he right 
of access to the judicial forum to adjudicate claims is an essential part of the statutory 
enforcement scheme.”  Id. at IV D.  Congress has given the EEOC initial responsibility for 
processing employment discrimination charges under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994), the 
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994) and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994). 
 59. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
 60. A number of bills have been introduced but have no promise of success.  See, e.g., 
Arbitration: Senate Sub-committee Hears Testimony on Arbitration of Employment Bias 
Disputes, available in LEXIS, BNA DAILY LAB. REP. 42 DLR A-10 (2000) (Mar. 2, 2000). 
 61. See EEOC Policy, supra note 58, at V B. 
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arbitration.  Assuming that a voluntary agreement to arbitrate statutory 
employment claims can withstand scrutiny, then obviously arbitration 
schemes, at least carefully drafted ones, may be fair enough to survive a claim 
of substantive unconscionability. 
In 1995, an American Bar Association (ABA) task force devised a set of 
standards to guide and to evaluate arbitral procedures for these claims.  A Due 
Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes arising 
out of the Employment Relationship62 (“Due Process Protocol”) calls for a 
knowing agreement to arbitrate these claims;63 an employee right to a 
representative of choice (with a recommendation of possible employer 
reimbursement of part of the employee’s attorney fees); adequate, but limited 
discovery with adequate employee access to information relevant to the claim; 
and a qualified, independent, unbiased arbitrator (familiar with the statutory 
issues, and with workplace and employment issues) who has a duty to disclose 
any conflict of interest and who is chosen through a joint, fair selection 
process.  The Due Process Protocol further recommends that the arbitrator 
should have authority to award the full range of statutory remedies; the 
arbitrator should issue an award with an opinion summarizing the issues 
decided and a statement explaining the disposition of statutory claims; that 
absent circumstances of economic hardship, the parties should share the 
arbitrator’s fees and expenses to ensure arbitrator neutrality; and that there 
should be only limited judicial review of the final and binding award.64  In 
theory, if the terms of an arbitration procedure comply with the Due Process 
Protocol, it should be viewed as a fair and non-oppressive arbitration process.  
But what if this fair arbitration procedure is part of mandatory pre-dispute 
agreement to arbitrate employment claims?  Should a court still refuse to 
enforce this arbitration procedure, which is not substantively unconscionable, 
 
 62. Prototype Agreement on Job Bias Dispute Resolution (Text), available in LEXIS, BNA 
DAILY LAB. REP. 1995 DLR 91 d34 (May 11, 1995) (hereinafter “Due Process Protocol”).  The 
task force members were designated by their respective organizations, but the protocol reflects 
the members’ individual views.  Id.  The task force members included employer, union and 
employee representatives of the ABA Labor and Employment Section, the American  Arbitration 
Association, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, American Civil Liberties Union, the 
National Employment Lawyers Association, the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 
and the National Academy of Arbitrators.  Id.  Because the Due Process Protocol task force 
members could not agree, the protocol takes no position on mandatory arbitration agreements.  Id. 
 63. Cf. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 61 (1995) (noting that enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a Title VII discrimination 
claim requires proof that the employee knowingly entered the arbitration agreement). 
 64. Due Process Protocol, supra note 62.  It is noteworthy that the Commission on the 
Future of Worker-Management Relations proposed a similar set of procedural fairness standards.  
Dunlop Report, supra note 57, at 30-32.  While the Due Process Protocol takes no position on 
mandatory arbitration schemes, the Dunlop Commission rejected use of mandatory predispute 
arbitration but suggested that the subject should be revisited in the future.  Id. at 33. 
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simply because it is contained in a contract of adhesion imposed on an 
employee as a condition of employment? 
Blanket rejection of a mandatory pre-dispute employment arbitration 
scheme assumes that compared to courts, arbitration will be inferior or 
inadequate to protect employee interests.65  Again, the Supreme Court rejected 
this line of attack in Gilmer even as to statutory claims.  Such criticism is also 
ill founded because it ignores the advantages arbitration may afford employees.  
If the process is a fair one, a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration procedure may 
provide the only realistic opportunity for the employee to pursue an 
employment claim.  Due to the volume of claims and the EEOC’s limited 
budget, the vast majority of employment discrimination claims are not resolved 
by the EEOC or by trial.66  Employees in lower paying jobs cannot afford the 
time necessary to pursue a claim in court and juries are less likely to award 
them large monetary damages.67  Lower wage earners also are likely to have 
difficulty finding an attorney to represent them because attorneys simply 
cannot afford to take to court cases with only a small potential for recovery.68  
Attorneys may be more willing to represent employees in arbitration which 
should consume less time than a court case would, and at least one study has 
found that legal fees were lower in arbitration.69  Based on experience in labor 
arbitration, pro se representation may also be used more effectively and with 
fewer risks than in court because of the more informal nature of arbitration. 
There is also a greater opportunity for an employee to have a “day in 
court” in an arbitration procedure, than in the litigation process.70  A recent 
Department of Justice study of employment civil rights cases filed in federal 
district courts from 1990 through 1998 found that the percentage of 
employment claims resolved by trial decreased from 9% in 1990 to 5% in 
1998.71  Moreover, one analysis found that in 1994 the majority (60%) of 
 
 65. EEOC Policy, supra note 58, at VI. 
 66. See Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, EMPLOYEE RTS. & 
EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 221, 245-47 (1997) (hereinafter “Reflections”).  From 1990 to 1998, the 
number of employment claims filed in federal district court tripled from 8,413 to 23,735.  DOJ 
report, supra note 54, at 2. 
 67. Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading With Mandatory Arbitration of 
Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 293, 308 (Winter 1999) (paper presented 
during the “Alternative Dispute Resolution” conference at The W.J. Usery, Jr. Center for the 
Workplace, Georgia State Univ., Atlanta, Georgia (Nov. 2, 1999)). 
 68. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 55, at 7-8.  See also Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: 
Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 29, 57-59 (Fall 1998). 
 69. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., ALTERNATIVE DISP. RESOL.: EMPLOYER’S EXPERIENCE 
WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE GAO/GGD – 97-157 at 19 (1997). 
 70. “[I]n  ‘litigation . . . relatively few employees survive the procedural hurdles necessary to 
take a case to trial in the federal courts.’”  Edwards, supra note 67, at 308. 
 71. DOJ Report, supra note 54, at 6. 
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employment cases filed in federal district court were resolved by pre-trial 
motions and that employers won 98% of those motions.72 
According to the Department of Justice study, from 1990 to 1998, 
employee plaintiffs won at trial an average of 29.3% of the cases that went to 
trial.73  In 1998, 78% of the trials of employment cases were jury trials, and 
employees won in 35.5% of all cases disposed of by trial.74  This employee 
“win rate” does not support the perception that employees automatically will 
fare better if a jury decides the case.  To compare how much employees won in 
judicial as opposed to arbitral resolutions of employment claims, one 
commentator weighed the percentage of the total demand received in 
arbitration and in litigation and concluded that “far more employees win in 
arbitration than in court, and, overall, employees who take their disputes to 
arbitration collect more than those who go to court.”75 
An arbitration procedure that finally resolves cases relatively quickly 
(compared with judicial resolution) offers employees a more realistic 
opportunity for reinstatement.76  An arbitration decision closer in time to the 
events or conduct in question will send a message to the workplace and exert a 
conduct regulating effect, which also may serve statutory goals.77  For 
example, members of a workplace will learn something from the reinstatement 
of a worker discharged in violation of the ADEA or the ADA.  A written 
opinion explaining the arbitration award, which the Due Process Protocol 
recommends, will also influence workplace conduct.78 Furthermore, it is fair to 
assume that if employees will seize the opportunity to process employment 
claims through arbitration, then the number of arbitration decisions will 
similarly exert a conduct regulating effect on the workplace as people react to 
 
 72. Lewis Maltby, supra note 68, at 47. 
 73. Average based on DOJ Report, supra note 54, at 9 and Table 9.  The study found a 
dramatic increase in the number of employment cases resolved by jury trial; from 35% in 1990 to 
78% in 1998.  Id. at 6-7 and Figure 2. 
 74. DOJ Report, supra note 54, at 6-7 and Figure 2 and Table 9. 
 75. Lewis Maltby, Employment Arbitration: Is It Really Second Class Justice?  DISP. 
RESOL. MAG. Fall 1999, at 23-24. 
 76. See Reflections, supra note 66, at 249-55.  The Department of Justice study found the 
federal district court processing time was 18 months in 1998; this does not include the additional 
case processing time taken by the EEOC process in discrimination cases.  DOJ Report, supra note 
54, at 11.  By contrast, one study found that it took 8.6 months to process a case in arbitration.  
Maltby, supra note 68, at 55. 
 77. Stephen W. Skrainka, The Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employment Manuals 
and Collective Bargaining Agreements for Resolving Civil Rights, AGE and ADA Claims, 37 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 985, 992-93 (1993). 
 78. Due Process Protocol, supra note 62.  See also Josef Rohlik, Arbitrators Should Write 
Opinions for Parties and for Courts, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 933 (2000). 
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the arbitration results.79  Thus, in addition to resolving individual claims and 
workplace controversies, arbitration of statutory claims may also further 
broader statutory goals including, e.g., the goal of eradicating discrimination 
from the workplace. 
The foregoing discussion of the benefits of arbitration to employees and 
arbitration’s contribution to broader statutory goals puts mandatory arbitration 
in perspective.  For employees who are not “forced” to resolve employment 
disputes in arbitration, resolution of these claims in court or by trial is not an 
automatic, readily-accessible alternative.  In the context of the employment 
setting and relationship, arbitration may provide a preferable, efficient and 
beneficial process for employees.  The point of this section has been to dispel 
the idea that, in general, a fair arbitral process for the resolution of employment 
claims should be denied enforcement on grounds of unconscionability simply 
because it was the product of a mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreement.  
The next section will test the limits of unconscionability in three cases of 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 
IV. EXAMPLES OF MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 
SCHEMES 
While the strongest attacks on mandatory employment agreements focus 
on agreements to arbitrate statutory claims, it must be emphasized that the 
unconscionability analysis is not so limited.  Any agreement to arbitrate 
employment claims, whether it does or does not include statutory claims, may 
be denied enforcement, in full or in part, if the court finds it to be 
unconscionable.  In addition, the evaluation of fairness with respect to the 
arbitration clause may in fact depend on the issue in a particular dispute, such 
as, whether the rights and obligations of the parties are governed by mandatory 
rules of a statute. 
This section will consider three cases in which the plaintiff employees 
sought to avoid the operation of a mandatory pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate 
employment claims.  Each case raises questions highlighting disparity of 
bargaining power and the fairness of key elements of any arbitration scheme: 
limited judicial review, arbitrator selection process, limited remedies and 
payment of the arbitrator’s fee.  When analyzed in terms of unconscionability, 
these case examples raise the broader question of whether and when courts 
should strike down or tinker with these arbitration agreements.  These cases 
were chosen for this discussion because the differences in the parties, the 
 
 79. See, e.g., Susan A. FitzGibbon, Arbitration, Mediation and Sexual Harassment, 5 
PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 693, 726-29 (1999).  See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the 
“HAVES” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 19, 47-48 (1999) (noting that ADR systems perceived as fair and efficient may produce 
increased number of claims). 
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claims and the arbitration procedures raise a broad range of facts and issues 
that should resonate with students of contracts and prompt a rigorous analysis 
of the theory and application of unconscionability. 
In Cole v. Burns,80 when a new company took over his former employer’s 
business, security guard Cole had to sign a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate 
employment claims to retain his job.  The arbitration agreement clearly 
provided for coverage of all employment matters, including federal and state 
statutory claims, provided for arbitration at the option of the employer and also 
stated as follows: 
The right to a trial, and to a trial by jury, is of value.  YOU MAY WISH TO 
CONSULT AN ATTORNEY PRIOR TO SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT.  IF 
SO, TAKE A COPY OF THIS FORM WITH YOU.  HOWEVER, YOU 
WILL NOT BE OFFERED EMPLOYMENT UNTIL THIS FORM IS 
SIGNED AND RETURNED BY YOU.81 
This paragraph with bold letters and the other plain language of the 
agreement indicate that the employee “knowingly” entered this contract of 
adhesion with no possibility of bargaining over the terms.  The arbitration 
agreement also provided for the appointment of a neutral arbitrator through the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA),82 for the arbitration to be conducted 
according to AAA’s rules, and the parties concurred that this agreement 
authorized the arbitrator to apply applicable statutory law in substance and 
remedy.83 When Cole subsequently sued Burns under Title VII for 
discrimination, harassment and retaliation based on race, he sought to avoid the 
operation of the arbitration clause. 
Considering the arbitration agreement and the applicable AAA rules, the 
court concluded that the agreement was valid under the Gilmer analysis 
because it provided for a neutral arbitrator, for adequate discovery, for full 
statutory remedies, for a written award and did not provide for prohibitive 
preliminary forum fees or expenses.84  Still the court enforced this mandatory 
 
 80. Cole v. Burns Intern Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  It is noteworthy 
that the author of the majority opinion is Chief Judge Harry Edwards, a renowned labor and 
employment law professor who, prior to joining the bench, was a well known labor arbitrator and 
attorney.  The Cole opinion contains an illuminating discussion of the difference between labor 
arbitration (between a union and management) and employment arbitration (between an 
individual employee and the employer).  Id. at 1470-79. 
 81. Id. at 1469 (emphasis in original).  In this agreement the parties also waived the right to a 
jury trial.  Id. 
 82. The American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) is a well-established (seventy-five year-
old), not-for-profit agency which administers dispute resolution services, primarily offering 
arbitration and mediation.  See American Arbitration Associate Website at <http://www.adr.org>.  
AAA’s current National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes expressly adopt and 
endorse the Due Process Protocol. 
 83. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1469 & n.3. 
 84. Id. at 1482. 
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pre-dispute arbitration agreement only with the addition of a requirement that 
the employer pay the fees and expenses of the arbitrator.85  The court 
emphasized that the oppressive take-it-or-leave-it nature of the bargain 
imposing arbitration at the employer’s option compelled this employer’s 
responsibility to pay for the arbitrator’s services.  Absent the insertion of this 
clause, the court reasoned, a lower wage earning employee could effectively be 
denied his statutory right because he could not afford to gain access to the 
arbitral forum.86 
Rather than engaging in an analysis of unconscionability, the court 
followed a circuitous process of interpretation to achieve this outcome: the 
preference for an interpretation that makes a contract lawful and for 
interpretation of ambiguous terms against the drafter compelled the court to 
define and clarify this otherwise open term, to save the contract from being 
unenforceable.87  One may speculate that the court preferred to adjust the 
agreement using the more “covert tool” of interpretation because the court’s 
conclusion on this point was not inescapable. 
To reach this same result using an unconscionability analysis, the court 
could have found that the procedural unconscionability, evidenced by the 
contract of adhesion and an employee with essentially no bargaining power, 
prompted scrutiny of the terms despite the employee’s agreement to them 
manifested by his signature.  The arbitration process including the AAA rules 
was fair enough, but to ensure the employee’s right to vindicate his statutory 
claim in this alternative forum, the employee needed access to the alternate 
forum.  To process a claim in court, the employee would have to pay a filing 
fee and attorney fees but the services of the judge would be free.  Because the 
fees of an arbitrator may be quite expensive and payment of even half of a 
large fee could prevent the employee from pursuing his claim, the agreement 
unaltered would be too oppressive to enforce.  The court could have then 
avoided this unconscionable result by adjusting the agreement to require the 
employer to pay for the arbitrator’s fees. 
But the conclusion that under a mandatory pre-dispute agreement to 
arbitrate statutory employment claims, fair process requires the employer to 
pay the arbitrator’s fees is a controversial one.88  While the fees of arbitrators 
 
 85. Id. at 1485. 
 86. Id. at 1484. 
 87. Id. at 1485-86. 
 88. Some courts have adopted this requirement.  See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt., 
Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding a mandatory arbitration agreement, which was 
entered into as a condition of continued employment, and which required the employee to pay a 
portion of the arbitrator’s fees, unenforceable under the FAA); Paladino v. Avnet Computer 
Techs., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that the imposition on employee of 
substantial arbitration costs ($2000) is a legitimate basis for the conclusion that the clause does 
not comport with statutory policy). 
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may be high, generally the attorney’s fees will be far more expensive.  As 
previously noted, the Due Process Protocol calls for the parties to share the 
arbitrator’s fees to ensure arbitrator neutrality.89  Exclusive employer 
responsibility for the arbitrator’s fees adds to the concern of some critics for a 
“repeat player” effect, that is, the concern that arbitrators will tend to favor 
employers because employers are more likely to need the services of an 
arbitrator again.90  In Cole, the court rejected these concerns noting that 
professional and ethical standards of arbitrators as well as the rules of 
administering agencies such as AAA protect against arbitral bias.91  The point 
here is not to suggest the validity of these criticisms because supporting 
evidence is lacking,92 but rather to show that the court’s conclusion was not 
obvious or automatic.  Once the disparity of bargaining power is eliminated as 
the bar to enforcement, it would appear that the bargain lacked Younger’s 
criteria of unconscionability. 
Imposing the requirement that employers must pay the arbitrator’s fee in 
mandatory arbitration of statutory employment claim schemes could produce 
an unintended effect of motivating employers to cancel the mandatory 
arbitration program.  In other words, the court’s paternalistic effort to protect 
employees could instead deprive them of the alternative forum.  As previously 
noted, a mandatory arbitration scheme may provide employees the only real 
opportunity to pursue an employment claim particularly for employees who are 
low wage earners. 
Turning to a different issue, in Cole the court rejected the argument that 
limited judicial review of the arbitration award rendered the agreement 
unconscionable.  In view of the Supreme Court’s enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate a variety of statutory claims under the limited judicial review standard 
of the FAA,93 the court had no choice but to find that standard of review fair 
and adequate.  The court noted that in addition to the FAA grounds of review 
(mainly for fraud, arbitral bias, arbitral misconduct in handling the process or 
in exceeding the authority conferred), awards are also subject to judicially 
recognized grounds of review for violation of public policy or for manifest 
disregard of the law by the arbitrator.94  Under this manifest disregard 
standard, the court articulated a tougher level of review which would be 
“sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and 
 
 89. Due Process Protocol, supra note 62, at C6. 
 90. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 213-14 (1997) (based on small study of only 31 cases, the 
author found a repeat player effect but did not establish the cause).  But see Menkel-Meadow, 
supra note 79, at 57-58 (little empirical evidence to support repeat player effect). 
 91. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485. 
 92. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 79, at 57-58. 
 93. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, n.4 (1991). 
 94. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1486-87. 
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applied statutory law.”95  How far courts may take this analysis remains to be 
seen, but it is fair to conclude that judges will not hesitate to review and 
overturn awards which seem unfair to them.96  Despite extremely limited 
grounds of review of labor arbitration awards, courts routinely stretch the 
limits to vacate awards.97  Of course this may not always benefit the employee.  
For example, in labor arbitration cases, courts often overturn arbitration awards 
which reinstated employees fired for conduct raising public policy concerns.  
The Supreme Court will revisit the standard of review to vacate awards on 
public policy grounds in the 2000-2001 term.98 
It should also be noted that unconscionability has a place apart from and 
offers protection beyond either the public policy or manifest disregard of law 
grounds for vacation of arbitration awards.  An unconscionable arbitration 
agreement will not be enforced and there will be no arbitration.  By contrast, 
under the public policy and manifest disregard of law standards of review, 
courts decide whether to enforce an existing arbitration award.  As such, the 
unconscionability analysis provides another means to attack a mandatory 
employment arbitration scheme. 
The second case for discussion, Hooters, Inc. v. Phillips, involves the pre-
dispute employment arbitration procedure imposed by the company on a 
female bartender who alleged sexual harassment.99  The arbitration agreement 
contained a number of one-sided terms favoring the employer.  One provision 
included an initial requirement for the employee to explain her claim and list 
fact witnesses with no reciprocal company obligation to respond, explain 
defenses or list witnesses.  Other terms gave the company rights to “expand the 
scope of arbitration to any matter,” to seek a summary judgment, to record the 
hearing, to cancel the arbitration agreement on thirty days notice, and to 
modify the arbitration rules without notice, while providing no corresponding 
rights to employees.100  The most egregious term established a three-person 
arbitration panel to be chosen as follows: the company and the employee each 
would select an arbitrator and these arbitrators would then choose the third 
 
 95. Id. at 1487. 
 96. See, e.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(arbitrator’s failure to award attorney’s fees to plaintiff DeGaetano was manifest disregard of the 
law under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 97. For a discussion of unwarranted judicial tinkering with labor arbitration awards, see 
Susan A. FitzGibbon, The Judicial Itch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 485 (1990). 
 98. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., No. 98-2527, 1999 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 1994 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Mar. 20, 
2000) (No. 99-1038).  The Court will consider “whether courts asked to vacate arbitration awards 
on public policy grounds are limited to determining whether the award itself violates positive law 
or requires unlawful conduct, or instead may identify ‘well defined and dominant’ public policies 
and set aside arbitration awards that contravene such policies.”  Id. 
 99. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 100. Id. at 938-39. 
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“neutral” arbitrator.  A number of industries routinely follow such a procedure 
to select a neutral labor arbitrator and that neutral may be chosen from a list of 
arbitrators upon whom the company and union have previously agreed.101  By 
contrast, the Hooters arbitration agreement provided for selection of the 
employee’s arbitrator and of the third arbitrator from a list of arbitrators chosen 
only by the company, with no express limits on those listed, that is, the 
company could include company managers, or the company could remove 
from the list any neutral who had ruled against the company.102  In light of 
these oppressive terms, the court refused to enforce this arbitration agreement 
on the ground that the employer had breached its obligation to create a dispute 
resolution process worthy of the name “arbitration.” 
The Hooters case provides a striking example of an arbitration scheme, 
which would not withstand scrutiny on the ground of unconscionability.  An 
arbitration procedure, which gives the employer the right to choose the 
decisionmaker cannot be enforced.  The cornerstone of any fair arbitration 
scheme is a neutral arbitrator chosen by the parties through a fair selection 
process.103  The person who runs the hearing and the pre- and post-hearing 
process and who ultimately decides the case must be neutral and unbiased for 
the arbitration process to be fair and for the agreement to be enforceable.104 
In fact, the district court concluded that the Hooters arbitration agreement 
was unconscionable and unenforceable.105  The district court emphasized the 
shocking unfairness of a number of the terms, including the biased arbitrator 
selection scheme and possible limits on statutory remedies106 to which the 
Fourth Circuit did not refer.  However, the district court went too far in citing 
the loss of the right to take a Title VII claim to court and the FAA’s provision 
on limited judicial review of awards as additional evidence of one-sided 
terms.107  Again, after the Gilmer decision, these concerns cannot be a basis for 
finding substantively unconscionable terms. 
To reach the conclusion that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, 
the district court also considered the fact that this was an adhesion contract 
imposed on a far less sophisticated party who had no bargaining power and 
that oppressive terms of the arbitration rules were “hidden” (because they were 
 
 101. For example, such a tripartite arbitration board is routinely used in the airline industry.  
For a discussion and evaluation of such arbitration panels, see FRANK ELKOURI, HOW 
ARBITRATION WORKS 176-81 (Martin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997). 
 102. Hooters, 173 F.3d at 938-39. 
 103. Due Process Protocol, supra note 62, at C. 
 104. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994); UAA § 12. 
 105. Hooters, Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D.S.C. 1998).  The district court also found 
no meeting of the minds on all material terms, that Hooter’s promise to arbitrate was illusory and 
that the agreement was void on public policy grounds.  Id. 
 106. Id. at 614. 
 107. Id. 
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practically unavailable) and “surprising,” i.e., beyond the employee’s 
reasonable expectations.108  The number of oppressive terms and apparent 
conflicts and confusion among the terms dictated the district court’s decision to 
refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement in its entirety.109 
In affidavits, arbitration experts including the then President of the 
National Academy of Arbitrators, George Nicolau, AAA Board of Directors 
member Lewis Maltby and Professor Dennis Nolan agreed that the Hooter’s 
arbitration scheme was singularly unfair to employees.110  To quote Professor 
Nolan, “the Hooters rules do not satisfy the minimum requirements of a fair 
arbitration system.”111  This reaction is reminiscent of the late Judge Irving 
Younger’s unconscionability analysis, which admittedly relied on his own 
conscience.  Judge Younger’s unconscionability analysis was a gutsy, I’ll-
know-it-when-I-see-it approach, and, in the Hooters case, it could not be 
missed. 
Unlike the employee plaintiffs in Cole or in Hooters, the employee seeking 
to avoid arbitration in Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. was the company’s vice-
president and chief financial officer,112 an employee who certainly bargained 
from a position of far greater strength than that of a security guard or a 
bartender.  Analyzing this case under California’s unconscionability statute, 
which adopted the text of U.C.C. § 2-302 and applied it to all contract cases,113 
the court still found that the pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate employment 
claims clause of Stirlen’s employment agreement was an unconscionable 
contract of adhesion.  The employer contended that the parties had equal 
bargaining power because the company had recruited Stirlen from another 
prestigious, lucrative position by offering a salary of $150,000 plus a number 
of “extras” beyond the standard executive employment agreement, including a 
signing bonus, stock options and a bonus plan.114  But because the arbitration 
clause was one of the non-negotiable terms contained in the “standard 
employment contract” and the bargaining over the aforementioned salary and 
extra terms did not effect the standard contract provisions, the court concluded 
that the arbitration provision was part of an adhesion contract and evidence of 
a procedurally unconscionable term. 
The arbitration clause of the standard employment contract expressly 
provided that it covered all disputes regarding employment, termination, the 
employment agreement and federal and state statutory employment claims; it 
excluded from coverage certain contractual claims initiated by the employer 
 
 108. Id. at 615. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Hooters, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 598. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 113. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985). 
 114. Stirlen, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 1533. 
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(for example, alleging violation of the non-compete clause); it imposed a strict 
one-year statute of limitations on requests for arbitration and provided for 
complete waiver of claims if the arbitration request did not comply with this 
timeframe; and it restricted the remedies available in arbitration exclusively to 
“a money award not to exceed the amount of actual damages for breach of 
contract.”115  Finding no special circumstances in the employer’s business or 
relation to this employee to warrant this limit on remedies which could, for 
example, deprive an employee of punitive damages for a tort claim or a 
violation of Title VII and of attorney’s fees available under federal statutes, 
and noting that the company retained its right to full common law and statutory 
remedies for certain contractual violations excluded from coverage of the 
arbitration clause, the court concluded that the terms of the arbitration clause 
were too oppressive to the employee.  The court could have invalidated only 
the term which seemed most offensive—the limitation on remedies—and 
enforced the remainder of the arbitration clause but the court ultimately 
decided that a number of the aforementioned terms of the arbitration clause 
produced such an extreme imbalance of rights and remedies between the 
parties that the entire clause was unconscionable.116  The court’s brief 
discussion of the general “disadvantages” of the arbitration process suggests 
that the old judicial disdain for and hostility to arbitration, especially to resolve 
statutory claims, may have contributed to the decision to scrap the entire 
arbitration clause.117 
But did employee Stirlen warrant this protection?  In terms of procedural 
unconscionability, he may not have had an opportunity to bargain over the 
terms of the arbitration provision, but he certainly bargained over other 
significant terms (salary, bonus, pension) and, if he was hired away from 
another high-level job, he had the opportunity to choose whether to take this 
job and to enter this agreement.  Any employee can turn down a position 
offered on the condition of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement and look for 
another job.  But those seeking lower paying jobs may have limited options 
and are less likely to have any bargaining power over any terms of 
employment.  The element of procedural unconscionability will more likely 
exist in those situations than in Vice President/Chief Financial Officer Stirlen’s 
case. 
If Stirlen’s adhesion contract presents only a modicum of procedural 
unconscionability, then the terms of the agreement should supply a pretty 
 
 115. Id. at 1528-29. 
 116. Id. at 1539-42. 
 117. It is noteworthy that in Stirlen, the court did not focus on the arbitration provision that 
the parties would share payment of the arbitrator’s fees.  Id. at 1529.  Obviously, the unfairness of 
this term depends on the employee’s position and level of pay.  Cf. Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. 
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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shocking measure of substantive unconscionability to avoid enforcement.  
Reviewing the terms, how unfair is it to require a company executive to 
request arbitration within one year of the occurrence of a termination or a 
covered dispute?  Expedited resolution of such disputes would seem to serve a 
legitimate business purpose and this deadline would not severely limit the 
exercise of his rights.  Preservation of the company’s right to bring to court 
certain contractual claims, such as an alleged violation of a non-compete 
clause, while requiring the employee to bring employment disputes to 
arbitration certainly gives the employer more options to protect its rights and 
interests, but is this disparity so unfair that it warrants a judicial rescue of an 
executive employee from this agreement?  If not, then the issue boils down to a 
standard arbitration clause, which may overstep the bounds of fairness by 
limiting the employee’s remedies. 
In his suit, Stirlen sought to nullify the arbitration clause and claimed 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, breach of contract, breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, defamation, intentional 
misrepresentation and violation of Labor Code § 970 which prohibits 
“knowing false representations” to induce an employee “to change from one 
place to another,”118 and which imposes double damages for a violation.119  
The limitation of remedies in the arbitration clause barring recovery of double 
damages for a violation of Labor Code § 970 effectively deprived Stirlen of his 
full statutory right and, as such, the remedies limitation warranted non-
enforcement.  Similarly, if Stirlen had alleged, e.g., a violation of Title VII, the 
limitation on remedies would deny Stirlen the right to vindicate his statutory 
claim fully, and should be struck down as an unconscionable term.  The 
question remains whether the unfairness of this term warranted invalidation of 
the entire arbitration clause or whether extracting the limitation of remedies 
would sufficiently avoid the problem of unconscionability. 
The conclusion that the remedies limitation is an unconscionable term rests 
on the fact that the employee raised a statutory claim and would be deprived of 
access to a full statutory remedy in arbitration.  As such, the determination of 
the unconscionability of a remedies limitation should focus on the claim raised 
at the time of enforcement of the arbitration clause.  This is comparable to the 
analysis under the U.C.C. § 2-719 provision that remedies limitations are 
enforceable, except for limits of “consequential damages for injury to the 
person in the case of consumer goods [which are] prima facie 
unconscionable.”120  In other words, by analogy to U.C.C. § 2-719, an 
arbitration clause limiting statutory remedies is prima facie unconscionable if 
the employee raises a statutory claim.  On the other hand, if Stirlen had alleged 
 
 118. Stirlen, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 1525. 
 119. CAL. LAB. CODE § 972 (West 1989). 
 120. U.C.C § 2-719(3). 
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no violation of any statute, then the arbitration clause limitation of damages 
should not be viewed as unconscionable. 
In conclusion, the different types of employees and mandatory arbitration 
schemes represented in these three cases—ranging from one lower level 
employee trapped in a sham process which failed to ensure a neutral arbitrator, 
to another lower level employer in a fair mandatory arbitration agreement only 
possibly flawed by shared responsibility for the arbitrator’s fee, to an executive 
employee restricted to limited damages recoverable in the arbitration process—
provide a rich basis for exploration of the unconscionability analysis and 
consideration of circumstances in which courts should adjust or refuse to 
enforce such agreements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mandatory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate employment claims may 
provide a variety of benefits: a process faster, less expensive, less formal and 
less hostile than litigation which still produces a final result; a process which 
allows the parties to choose an expert decisionmaker; and a process which will 
contribute to a reduction in the number of employment cases filed.  Of course 
to produce these benefits, the mandatory arbitration procedure must be fair.  
The doctrine of unconscionability is one measure of the fairness of these 
mandatory arbitration agreements.  In broad terms, the question at the heart of 
the unconscionability inquiry in these cases is whether this forum selection 
clause represents bad social policy and thus requires judicial regulation. Or, to 
put it in other words, should a mandatory agreement to arbitrate employment 
claims be treated like the limited warranty (or other limited or exclusive 
remedy) on a defective product which causes serious personal injury121 or like 
a regulation of a strictly economic loss, or, say, the requirement to retake the 
LSAT based on reasonable suspicion of cheating?122 
A number of unique factors relating to mandatory arbitration of 
employment claims will shape assessment of the setting, purpose and effect of 
the agreement.  Employers and employees have a relationship of some 
duration, which usually involves some regular interaction.  Employees want to 
keep their jobs or they want to decide for themselves whether or when to leave 
a job, and at work employees seek fair treatment, under statutes and in general.  
In the context of the employment relationship, as previously noted, arbitration 
agreements, which require final, out-of-court resolution of statutory and other 
employment claims may benefit individual employees and contribute to 
broader societal goals.  The arbitration agreement may provide the employee 
the only real possibility of access to a forum and an opportunity to process the 
claim; the reinstatement remedy may be a more available and realistic remedy; 
 
 121. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
 122. Cf. K.D. v. Educ. Testing Serv., 386 N.Y.S.2d 747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
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arbitral expertise and understanding of the workplace may produce more 
workable remedies, and finally, arbitration awards will exert a conduct 
regulating effect on the workplace and thus serve the goals of employment 
statutes.  On the other hand, it is undeniable that a statutory right established to 
eliminate discrimination or to provide a significant new benefit transcends 
ordinary economic issues, e.g., a distribution of economic loss, and as such it is 
susceptible to the analogy of unconscionability in enforcement under U.C.C. § 
2-719. 
For now and for the foreseeable future, employers who implement or 
revise a mandatory arbitration plan will be well advised to ensure that 
employees are aware that they are agreeing to arbitrate statutory employment 
claims.  Employees will not then be able to claim lack of knowledge or 
surprise as to the arbitration clause or its coverage. 
When these mandatory agreements to arbitrate claims are conditioned on 
employment, courts should scrutinize the terms, bearing in mind the claims to 
be arbitrated and the status of the employee in question.  For example, if an 
employee “knowingly” agrees as a condition of employment to an otherwise 
unobjectionable arbitration process, which meets the Due Process Protocol 
standards and allows for any remedy except punitive damages, enforcement of 
the remedies limitation should depend on the claims raised in arbitration.  If 
the employee alleges violation of a federal anti-discrimination statute, which 
allows recovery of punitive damages, then the remedies limitation should fail 
on grounds of unconscionability.  Again, by analogy to U.C.C. § 2-719, it 
would be too shocking and too unfair to enforce a contract term, which 
deprives an employee of full statutory rights.  On the other hand, no similar 
concern exists as to non-statutory rights for which remedies may be limited. 
With higher level employees, courts should take a hands-off approach and 
refuse to enforce only the most shocking, surprising or oppressive terms on the 
theory that a higher ranking employee had some bargaining power and some 
choice and likely traded-off the right to go to court for other terms.  Courts 
should more carefully assess the terms of the arbitration agreement in the case 
of a lower-level employee with no real bargaining power and limited choices 
even as to other job opportunities.  In either case, the court should ensure that 
the process is truly an arbitration process, that is, that it has the basic elements 
of an unbiased arbitrator, a fair arbitrator selection process, and a true 
opportunity to present and prove the employment claim. 
Because evaluation of these claims of unconscionability will involve 
comparisons between judicial procedures and arbitration procedures, courts 
must guard against lapsing into the old judicial hostility to arbitration.  Courts 
must also resist the urge to be overly protective, especially of lower level 
employees.  Routine refusals to enforce these arbitration agreements, or 
adjustments to the arbitration process, such as, requiring the employer to pay 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] TEACHING UNCONSCIONABILITY THROUGH AGREEMENTS 1425 
the arbitrator’s fees or requiring a transcript of the proceedings123 which add 
expense or make the process more cumbersome, may prompt employers to 
withdraw the mandatory arbitration schemes.  And while this result might 
delight the critics of mandatory arbitration, again, it may rob lower level 
employees of their only real opportunity for a forum.  If a reduction in the 
number of mandatory arbitration plans contributed to more crowded court 
dockets, the situation could be even more difficult for employees. 
Concerns of critics who would advocate broader exercise of judicial power 
to police these bargains should be reduced by the prospect of sufficient judicial 
review.  If judicial review of labor arbitration awards is predictive, courts will 
have no trouble in vacating and correcting awards where, in the court’s view, 
justice has not been served. 
At the same time, while the doctrine of unconscionability is advocated 
herein as a more appropriate method of dealing with the initial attack on the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses, it should be stressed that apart from 
limiting the analysis to truly shocking cases, courts should be limited to 
refusing enforcement only of objectionable elements of an arbitration clause if 
the objectionable elements are severable, rather than resorting to nullification 
of the entire clause. 
In sum, mandatory arbitration of employment claims offers a focused (on 
the employment context) and multi-faceted opportunity for students of 
contracts to explore the doctrine of unconscionability and the process of 
arbitration. 
 
 123. Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting 
the safeguard of a transcript in arbitration of statutory claims citing Samuel Estreicher, 
Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 791 (1990)). 
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